5. From Political to Military Battleground
The Making of a Military Genius
War has always been fought and won by foot soldiers in their boots or sandals. The Vietnam war saga during the Indochina period was no different. But the extent of victory or defeat will also depend on the comparative strength of the forces in the battlefield. The better trained and larger army would no doubt have more chance of defeating a smaller army deprived of basic necessities. Although many other elements come into play, and let's not play the armchair strategist here, leadership is tantamount. Like in sport, if you compare 2 teams you look at the players but also the coach, everything else being equal.
Leadership is the single most important factor in any conflict, especially when the conditions were unfavorable. The final outcome in the First Indochina War and its US sequel can be explained by the quality of leading actors. In that sense the end result was preordained. People of different cultural background adopted different priority in life. For Asians and particularly among the educated elite of the older generations, due to their education and social environment, the human element and value were more important than physical strength. Among the Viet Minh leadership, Ho, Giap and Dong fit that characterization.
With Pham Van Dong, 'the lone flower in the mud of VN' according to my father, Vo Nguyen Giap was the closest of Ho's partners. Coming from Quang Binh, central VN not too far from Ho's birthplace, Giap was a brilliant student of history and litterature also an avid admirer of Napoleon. As a consummate reader like Ho, he digested all the writings pertaining to political and military strategy from Machiavelli, to Clausewitz and Mao tse Tung. And he was the author of many books himself on the very subject. A theorist in warfare, he was a self taught person, with no background training whatsoever. His talent was innate, in his blood and for that he was the embodiment of a military genius.
While in Saigon, I've read the Time magazine when he was in the front cover for the first time in June 1966. For a VN personality, he appeared 3 times in front cover,only surpassed by Ho Chi Minh who had 4. It was a revealing experience reading him discussed about the War. I remembered him saying something like: the US could bomb North VN until it realizes that it will have no effect whatsoever and then it has to stop! That's exactly what happened in 1968, before the negotiation in Paris. He also had an ominous warning: that North VN will not abandon its pursuit for total victory even if the US drops nuclear bombs on its cities! Although I could imagine his impassioned voice uttering these phrases, the effect on the listener must have been chilling. Being an anti-communist at the time, I was stunned for I knew Giap was not grandstanding.
As a young high school student, in 1924, he was already tagged and closely watched by the French police, having participated in demonstrations against the authorities during the protests of Phan Boi Chau's arrest. And he was sent to prison himself many times during his early years. In 1936, while studying Law at the Hanoi University, he taught at Thanh Long high school. And the students of Hanoi urban society among them my uncle Bui Diem were captivated by his superior knowledge. Here was a young teacher describing the French Revolution and Napoleon military campaigns like they were his own. He even built a scale model of the Austerlitz battle using wood sticks from box matches and made passionate and riveting presentations to his audience.
June 1940 in Kunming, a date engraved in Giap's memory when he had the first encounter with an individual named Vuong who Giap recognized instantly as Nguyen ai Quoc or Ho Chi Minh. It was the beginning of a relationship that lasted 29 years, until Ho's passing. Giap will outlast his generation of fighters and died in 2014 at the age of 103. One of the lasting impression about Giap (and Dong also) was his unfailing loyalty to Ho, from the start. Giap recalled that when he met Ho for the first time on Chinese territory, not far from the VN border, he immediately was attached to Ho and felt like they already knew each other for a long time. He knew he would serve Ho, the revolutionary leader until the end.
Ho was no doubt the grand leader that his subordinates were waiting for. He so dominated and impressed his deputies to the point that he trusted them entirely and wasn't worried about being betrayed. Contrary to people's belief, Ho left his position as Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964 to Le Duan because of ill health, and not due to any forced removal. During his negotiations at Fontainebleau in 1946, Ho was in France for 5 months, during which time he gave full power to Giap as the minister of interior, to run the day to day business of the government. General Salan then asked Ho if he's worried to leave VN in the hands of Giap. Ho replied, according to Gerard Le Quang '' he (Giap) exists due to my support, without me all of them are nobodies...'' Loyalty, trust and dedication were the hallmark of Ho's leadership, so vital in a moment of life and death for his movement. He entrusted those qualities to his troops which fought under the most challenging conditions. Also Ho and his team had momentous baraka on many occasions to be able to fulfill their dream of national liberation.
From 1941 after their meeting in Kunming, Ho and Giap along with others like Vu Anh, Chu Van Tan put forward a program to train the ethnic minorities and constituting the first armed unit with the Man, the Tho, the Kinh by respecting their customs and culture and protecting their territory. Giap combined political and psychological indoctrination with military training with an emphasis on guerilla warfare. The rank and files under Giap command were already eager for an armed insurrection. But Ho, in October 1944, returning from China to Pac Bo, the main Viet Minh stronghold, advised for calm and patience. He insisted on propaganda actions and small scale attacks and disruption of enemy's line. The northern part of Tonkin had to be systematically 'pacified' by the Viet Minh by the kind of oil spread tactics before it could envisage the next step of massive operations involving larger units.
Then with a stroke of luck, the conditions changed in March 1945, when Japanese army mounting the offensive against the colonial government locked up the French garrisons, as we have mentioned. With the French neutralized, Giap troops could now prepare larger military operations and dealt major blows to the enemy units. But Giap always mounted attacks near his bases to rely on speed and logistical support. He already mastered the people's war principle by applying to perfection its 3 phases, as he would lay out to his troops.
People's War and People's Liberation
Imbued with teachings from Lenin, Mao and particularly Sun Tsu the Chinese Clausewitz, Giap devised his own principles of people's war by adapting Sun Tsu methods that even Mao Tse Tung credited his victory by applying Sun's teachings while fighting Chiang Kai Sheik. Ho personally translated Sun Tsu book 'The Art of War', by a 5th century BC Chinese general and strategist. This bible of military theory about war and politics attracted world wide attention. Giap under Ho's direction ordered Viet Minh officers to study it before going into battle. Even the Americans, after their defeat in VN adopted these military precepts when they invaded Irak in 1990 and the book still exists in every military academy in the US. Its imprint and influence were far reaching, and are still used in many sectors, including in business!
Since the VN War and its profound global impact, military thinking has in fact changes enormously. Gone is the standard conventional war based on weapons and materials with battlefield tactics and movements. The latest military conflict still under way- Afghanistan- puts also more emphasis on the psychological warfare aspect, i.e the importance of winning hearts and minds. As in Indochina, it doesn't involve just conventional armies but encompasses all aspects of the conflict and at the heart is gaining the support of the people we are fighting for. Well Giap in 1945 already had that in mind. He's by any standard, the forefather of adapting total warfare tactics to the real conditions of the masses, in another word the concept of people's war.
If the US led war in South VN was a sequel of the First Indochina War led by Giap, the Afghanistan War is the repeat of both, under quite similar conditions. From the military buildup of NATO forces, to the status quo on the ground, the arming and training of the hapless Afghan army, the last ditch manpower surge and finally the Afghanization of the war, we have witnessed the same familiar pattern. After 19 years of mission creep, the longest conflict so far, the US have to come to the conclusion that the war is unwinnable, that the military option was not possible. Even the negotiations resembled the VN conflict, with wranglings about which parties would be at the table. This is a déjà vu scenario that the US should have known better. After the French in Indochina, the disastrous repeat in Saigon and now Afghanistan. We can safely concluded that the lessons of history haven't been absorbed yet.
.Viet Minh top leaders were a bunch of intellects, well read with a propensity for writing. From Ho to Giap, Dong and Truong Chinh, the mysterious theoretician of the Party, they all translated or wrote books to indoctrinate or train their rank and file base to the new methods of revolutionary struggle. Truong Chinh in his detailed book ''the Resistance will Win'' laid out the 3 phases of revolution. He adopted them from Mao's teachings: first the withdrawal phase away from dense urban areas of cities and towns, then the equilibrium phase and finally the general offensive phase. He stressed the importance of timing from one phase to the next, evaluating the strength of the revolutionary forces, the support it gets from the population, the demoralization of the enemy and also the world context, or the support from the US, The Soviet Union and China. In both Indochina wars, the Communists applied exactly to the letter the model to great effect. If modern war strategy was an exact science, Giap would be a reputable scientist.
In 1946-47, Viet Minh forces were still at phase 1 of the struggle but that was about to change. With hard work and ingenuity Giap was building his forces from the bottom up, reinforcing and spreading their areas of control from the northern provinces to the Red Tonkin valley, especially Hanoi province and expanding their influence further South, to the Ha Tinh, Quang Nam zone. While leaving the big cities and towns to French troops, Giap wanted to isolate and harass them by cutting their lines of communication and transport. While colonial forces have the upper hand in number and armament, their movements and mobility were hampered by the bad conditions of roads and the hostility of the terrain, one of Giap definite asset. There`s no better condition than fighting a war while blending your troops into your own landscape.
In a war without fronts against an invisible enemy, hard to distinguish friends from foes, the rebel forces being everywhere and nowhere at the same time, French military superiority was equalized in short order. In a matter of a few years, from 1946-47, we can conclude that phase 2 of the war has come. According to Logevall, in early 1947 Leclerc on an assessment tour in Indochina concluded that in order to turn the tide militarily, France will need to deploy half a million or more of its troops in Indochina. Such a figure seemed ludicrous for the French political leaders at the time. But 20 years later, the US committed that exact number in the South and didn't fare any better.
On the home front, France in 1947 still dazed by the effects of WW2 on its soil, wasn't ready for another defeat in the colonies. It clings to the idea that another humiliation will have to be avoided and that the protectorate system will survive. That explained the political leaders hard line towards relinquishing Indochina and allowing the nations their independence. A lot more had to be done by Ho and Giap to convince French public opinion otherwise. Also the domino effect theory already was emerging to show that France other colonies, in North Africa, Madagascar were watching the events in Indochina and would test the French Metropole in earnest at the first sign of weakness.
The French military leaders were conscious that time was not on their side in Indochina, on the exact opposite of Giap and his forces whose strategy relied on prolonging the fight and testing the limit of their enemy resilience. While the Viet Minh were still at phase 1 of their master plan, Valluy and d'Argenlieu were eager to go for broke, sensing they were possibly at the last phase of their military superiority. Launching operations Lea and Ceinture in Oct 1947 involving large units, Valluy wanted to draw out the Viet Minh and destroy their main units and capture Viet Bac, Viet Minh HQ, and isolate their presence from southern part of China. But Giap already knew and avoided the bait. And he barely escaped being captured on more than one occasion. As usual, the enemy slipped through the lines and when French forces pulled back, then the Viet Minh moved back to the abandoned areas. It was a draw Giap was hoping for.
Valluy failure to destroy the enemy forces and the see saw battles for the next 2 years was the turning point in the Indochina War. With no end in sight, France was switching again to a diplomatic solution with an old card, Bao Dai. The ex emperor becoming advisor to Ho since his abdication in 1945 was in fact absent from his country, neglected and forgotten. He spent his days in the French riviera or in Hong Kong wasting money in casino and night club. His personality and reign in the critical context of Indochina at that time deserve to be a subject of an entire chapter by itself. Vietnam continuing misery and misfortune could be easily traced back to his mediocrity, indecision and utter lack of leadership. Loyal French collaborators coming from the Vietnamese were like those the Americans trusted years later: absent minded and chameleon politicians pretending to do the job but enriching themselves until being replaced.
Mao's new China and Ho's road to victory
China civil war and the Indochina war happened almost at the same time since 1945. Mao's victory over the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai Shek in the fall of 1949 definitely became the watershed event and a game changer for Ho. I am convinced that phase 3 of Ho's strategy started around September 1950 now that the northern base was secured with Mao as a firm ally, the Chinese having officially recognized the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) on January, 18 followed by the Soviets on the 30th. The support and acceptance by both Communist big brothers marked a definitive shift of Ho's foreign alliance push and the hope for the US administration support was officially dead.
Truman also has leaned noticeably over the French camp since his newly appointed Dean Acheson as secretary of State in January 1949. American foreign policy has straightened up, with a staunch anti-communist decision maker at the helm. And Washington was looking the changing conditions in South East Asia with grave concern, now that China became another threat to an already tense situation. With Ho overtly asking the Chinese ally for military and economic help, Truman would have to do the same for its ally the desperately nervous French. But then geography again played a pivotal role in the future outcome of Indochina. While the French remained confident to get American financial and military support in their fight, their commitment would go no further. French hope of direct US involvement on the ground in Indochina, in case of emergency was no more than a fainted illusion. Unfortunately the Americans have their own war to fight in Korea in 1950 with their soldier boots on the ground.
On this fast pursuit for racking up support from allies, Ho personal ties and prestige with the Chinese Communists made the difference. He has taken refuge and living in China for years, speaking their same language and eating the same rice. With his rear base well entrenched in the northern part of VN, next to Chinese border, Ho and Giap could sleep well at night at least knowing they have a well protected shelter in case of hot pursuit by the French. Whatever reservations they had about Chinese intentions, Ho and his colleagues had no choice but to welcome Chinese support. And it was more than substantial in all domains. Historians and experts unanimously confirmed that without the Chinese direct massive aid, Ho and his troops would have little chance of success, both against the French and the Americans.
In May 1949, according to Logevall book, Paris sent Georges Revers (defeat in English), a general with an ominous name to VN to assess the military situation., and make recommendation for the possibility of a Mao tse Tung take over in neighboring China. Revers in his report stressed the necessity for a political solution as the only alternative to the quagmire the French found themselves in and that no military solution was possible. The damning report by an author with a self defeating appellation went on to conclude that a victory by the Chinese communists and their assistance to the Viet Minh will further endanger the French position in Indochina.
In April 1950, Viet Minh government requested military aid in equipment, advisors and training through the CMAG (Chinese Military Advisory Group). Although this military assistance from China was essential, it was in no comparison to the US aid for the French. But the Chinese were very forthcoming to support Ho and the Viet Minh because Mao was predicting that US intentions were less than benevolent. That he will have to face US threat head on, as it will happen in Korea. And helping Ho and his troops would pay dividend in the long run, in a context of people's war of liberation. And more importantly for Ho and Giap was the supply line rear base for Viet Minh troops. In case of French offensive, they could easily withdraw into undetected redoubts, along the VN border, in the Cao Bang, Dong Khe, Dong Dang and Lang Son vicinity.
In people's war, the fish (soldier) strives in the water (people), and the people's army best bet is to be found in impregnable sanctuaries. Giap tactical modus operandi by optimizing the constraints of the terrain was unsurpassed. According to Giap, the people's army must treat the battleground terrain as an ally, not as another adversary. And for the first major offensive against the French, Giap put his finger on Cao Bang, the closest enemy garrison to the Chinese border. and the farthest from any French army command center. Giap's attack in Dong Khe area decimated the French forces that were stationed there during vicious battles extended over many weeks.
In early Sept under pressure from Viet Minh forces, general Carpentier the new Indochina commander took the fateful decision to evacuate the Cao Bang garrison located in the most northern part of VN. Carpentier was a fast rising star of the French military, rising the echelons from major to lieutenant general in 6 years. But his decision for retreating to Dong Khe, a 33 miles stretch was not a simple task. On the 16th, after months of careful preparation, Giap unleashed 5 battalions with artillery and mortar support against Dong Khe, preempting the French draw down from Cao Bang. The outpost was overwhelmed after stiff resistance resulting in the Cao Bang garrison now being cut off. French forces stationed there had no other choice but forcing through enemy lines. The long treacherous march out of Cao Bang was poorly executed. It fell into Viet Minh ambushes that annihilated both the retreating forces as well as the reinforcements coming from That Khe, another outpost in the South of Dong Khe.
In total the French suffered 6000 casualties out of the approximate 10,000 (?) initially on the ground and scores of heavy equipment and weapon were lost. General Carpentier having no experience in Indochina saw his star tumbling as fast as its rise in the battleground of the Far East. The aftershock of Cao Bang rout was felt throughout the Northern province with Lang Son a big town being abandoned. The French fell back practically to the Hanoi vicinity area, withdrawing from all the garrisons from Lao Cai the northern west part to coastal Mong Cai in the east, a perimeter of more than 350 miles wide.
The entire northern part of Tonkin was evacuated and falling into Giap's control. But more important was the realization that Viet Minh forces were equal in heavy armament, logistics with superior manpower and tactical leadership quality. It was the most humiliating defeat ever suffered by France outside of its territory for centuries since the Montcalm battle in Quebec in 1759 according to well known reporter and author Bernard Fall. With the arrival of a new commander in chief, De Lattre de Tassigny, perhaps French honor can be saved and for how long?.
The last lap from a new savior
At the late stage of the game, France resolutely decided to ramp up its conduct of the war against Giap and his troops with a new leader: general de Lattre de Tassigny, a legendary WW2 commander who did more than his share in the fight against Nazi Germany. Above all, de Lattre was an ardent anti-communist. Had France sent him to Indochina earlier, during the fragile debut of the Viet Minh, maybe the situation of Indochina couldn't have been so dim. But at least for once, French decision makers saw the necessity for good leadership in the fight against Communism.
And leadership, de Lattre possessed in excess. From now on, de Lattre would show how to lead his men on the ground and sanctioned those who didn't obey his orders. His belief in the greatness of France was his drive to conduct the fight against the dark forces of totalitarianism and Marxism. His messianic message for the preservation of the glory of France was unshakable. But in his new task of rescuing Indochina, there's a skillful message: the struggle against the Viet Minh must be fought by the Vietnamese first with France support. In an emotional speech on July 11, 1951 in lycee Chasseloup-Laubat the high school (that I attended years later), he challenged the youth of VN not to be 'attentist' or fence-sitters , and to come out and defend their motherland.
As a famous and respected military leader, de Lattre also was an astute student of politics. Although his methods were tough and unyielding on his subordinates, he grasped the necessity that the fighting the VN communists could not be done with France taking the burden alone. The VN people has to choose side, as he told in his famous speech. Either they fight for the Viet Minh, under a bad cause, or join the French in their battle for a democratic VN. But the signs were obvious that the VN people were split and torn and their allegiance was neither with the French nor for the Viet Minh.
They were the innocent victims of a struggle not of their own choosing. How could it be otherwise? The VN middle class and the uneducated peasantry were all longing for a normal and peaceful life. For the intelligentsia, it's rather confusing and complex. The underlying consensus among the VN elite was a rejection of French oppression but the means to attain national independence was in dispute, and in fact the root cause of VN's tragedy.
If I were listening to de Lattre in 1951, how would I have reacted? Beyond the eloquence and reasoned rhetoric, de Lattre wouldn't convince me a bit. To ask an educated VN student to fight for an estranged mère patrie France while his own soil is enslaved and occupied is absurd. In that sense Bao Dai, although a French stooge has the appropriate answer: give us back our independence then we will fight for ourselves. But de Lattre has a different subtle message for the French back home for it's time to let the VN fighting among themselves. With the embryonic Vietnamese National Army (VNA) under the French wing, he accelerated what the French called 'jaunissement' (yellowing) of the war effort, a precursor to Vietnamization, a more dignified labeling under Nixon.
De Lattre already knew that France resources and resoluteness were at the breaking point. And with his son Bernard making the ultimate sacrifice in this ungrateful land, with a tinge of bitterness he thought it's time for a last push to turn the page sooner than later. Although his tour of duty was brief, no more than a year, de Lattre left an unmistakable mark in the battlefield, giving Giap and the Viet Minh all the headache they could handle. Giap sensing that the wind has shifted in his favor decided that the people's war he so carefully planned should enter phase 3 i.e the general offensive.
Giap looked at the forces comparative alignment and thought that he had the capacity for a decisive blow by attacking Vinh Yen, no more than 30 miles northwest of Hanoi. If he succeeded the road to the capital would be open and the victory close at hand. But he totally miscalculated the ground conditions and de Lattre response. The famed general aristocrat unleashed his entire air power into the battle, using recently provided napalm bombs by the US in the heaviest bombing of the war. A ring of fire rained down on the successive waves of enemy assaults and by January 17th, 1951 Viet Minh 312th Division tried a final mass attack on Vinh Yen, again under a curtain of fire from napalm bombs. On that day the French came out victorious under de Lattre personal command and Giap lost 6000 dead and 8000 wounded of his troops, the most serious defeat he encountered so far.
The same scenario and result happened in Mao Khe near Hai Phong and Ninh Binh in the month of May, where Giap lost 9000 troops and 1000 captured according to Logevall. The Viet Minh Central Committee put the blame on Giap cockiness for underestimating the French capability and firepower. Phase 3 general offensive of the Communists started on the wrong foot. Giap under criticism was forced to reverse course and readopted guerrilla tactics for the time being, another 3 years for final victory. If Giap humiliation on the ground was a collective setback for the Viet Minh, de Lattre's son Bernard death near Nam Dinh on the same month of May was a personal tragedy that de Lattre himself would not recover. For de Lattre, the responsability of his son's death rested on his own shoulder for he personally insisted that lieutenant Bernard served on a commando unit fighting a despicable enemy.
War has always been fought and won by foot soldiers in their boots or sandals. The Vietnam war saga during the Indochina period was no different. But the extent of victory or defeat will also depend on the comparative strength of the forces in the battlefield. The better trained and larger army would no doubt have more chance of defeating a smaller army deprived of basic necessities. Although many other elements come into play, and let's not play the armchair strategist here, leadership is tantamount. Like in sport, if you compare 2 teams you look at the players but also the coach, everything else being equal.
Leadership is the single most important factor in any conflict, especially when the conditions were unfavorable. The final outcome in the First Indochina War and its US sequel can be explained by the quality of leading actors. In that sense the end result was preordained. People of different cultural background adopted different priority in life. For Asians and particularly among the educated elite of the older generations, due to their education and social environment, the human element and value were more important than physical strength. Among the Viet Minh leadership, Ho, Giap and Dong fit that characterization.
With Pham Van Dong, 'the lone flower in the mud of VN' according to my father, Vo Nguyen Giap was the closest of Ho's partners. Coming from Quang Binh, central VN not too far from Ho's birthplace, Giap was a brilliant student of history and litterature also an avid admirer of Napoleon. As a consummate reader like Ho, he digested all the writings pertaining to political and military strategy from Machiavelli, to Clausewitz and Mao tse Tung. And he was the author of many books himself on the very subject. A theorist in warfare, he was a self taught person, with no background training whatsoever. His talent was innate, in his blood and for that he was the embodiment of a military genius.
While in Saigon, I've read the Time magazine when he was in the front cover for the first time in June 1966. For a VN personality, he appeared 3 times in front cover,only surpassed by Ho Chi Minh who had 4. It was a revealing experience reading him discussed about the War. I remembered him saying something like: the US could bomb North VN until it realizes that it will have no effect whatsoever and then it has to stop! That's exactly what happened in 1968, before the negotiation in Paris. He also had an ominous warning: that North VN will not abandon its pursuit for total victory even if the US drops nuclear bombs on its cities! Although I could imagine his impassioned voice uttering these phrases, the effect on the listener must have been chilling. Being an anti-communist at the time, I was stunned for I knew Giap was not grandstanding.
As a young high school student, in 1924, he was already tagged and closely watched by the French police, having participated in demonstrations against the authorities during the protests of Phan Boi Chau's arrest. And he was sent to prison himself many times during his early years. In 1936, while studying Law at the Hanoi University, he taught at Thanh Long high school. And the students of Hanoi urban society among them my uncle Bui Diem were captivated by his superior knowledge. Here was a young teacher describing the French Revolution and Napoleon military campaigns like they were his own. He even built a scale model of the Austerlitz battle using wood sticks from box matches and made passionate and riveting presentations to his audience.
June 1940 in Kunming, a date engraved in Giap's memory when he had the first encounter with an individual named Vuong who Giap recognized instantly as Nguyen ai Quoc or Ho Chi Minh. It was the beginning of a relationship that lasted 29 years, until Ho's passing. Giap will outlast his generation of fighters and died in 2014 at the age of 103. One of the lasting impression about Giap (and Dong also) was his unfailing loyalty to Ho, from the start. Giap recalled that when he met Ho for the first time on Chinese territory, not far from the VN border, he immediately was attached to Ho and felt like they already knew each other for a long time. He knew he would serve Ho, the revolutionary leader until the end.
Ho was no doubt the grand leader that his subordinates were waiting for. He so dominated and impressed his deputies to the point that he trusted them entirely and wasn't worried about being betrayed. Contrary to people's belief, Ho left his position as Secretary of the Communist Party in 1964 to Le Duan because of ill health, and not due to any forced removal. During his negotiations at Fontainebleau in 1946, Ho was in France for 5 months, during which time he gave full power to Giap as the minister of interior, to run the day to day business of the government. General Salan then asked Ho if he's worried to leave VN in the hands of Giap. Ho replied, according to Gerard Le Quang '' he (Giap) exists due to my support, without me all of them are nobodies...'' Loyalty, trust and dedication were the hallmark of Ho's leadership, so vital in a moment of life and death for his movement. He entrusted those qualities to his troops which fought under the most challenging conditions. Also Ho and his team had momentous baraka on many occasions to be able to fulfill their dream of national liberation.
From 1941 after their meeting in Kunming, Ho and Giap along with others like Vu Anh, Chu Van Tan put forward a program to train the ethnic minorities and constituting the first armed unit with the Man, the Tho, the Kinh by respecting their customs and culture and protecting their territory. Giap combined political and psychological indoctrination with military training with an emphasis on guerilla warfare. The rank and files under Giap command were already eager for an armed insurrection. But Ho, in October 1944, returning from China to Pac Bo, the main Viet Minh stronghold, advised for calm and patience. He insisted on propaganda actions and small scale attacks and disruption of enemy's line. The northern part of Tonkin had to be systematically 'pacified' by the Viet Minh by the kind of oil spread tactics before it could envisage the next step of massive operations involving larger units.
Then with a stroke of luck, the conditions changed in March 1945, when Japanese army mounting the offensive against the colonial government locked up the French garrisons, as we have mentioned. With the French neutralized, Giap troops could now prepare larger military operations and dealt major blows to the enemy units. But Giap always mounted attacks near his bases to rely on speed and logistical support. He already mastered the people's war principle by applying to perfection its 3 phases, as he would lay out to his troops.
People's War and People's Liberation
Imbued with teachings from Lenin, Mao and particularly Sun Tsu the Chinese Clausewitz, Giap devised his own principles of people's war by adapting Sun Tsu methods that even Mao Tse Tung credited his victory by applying Sun's teachings while fighting Chiang Kai Sheik. Ho personally translated Sun Tsu book 'The Art of War', by a 5th century BC Chinese general and strategist. This bible of military theory about war and politics attracted world wide attention. Giap under Ho's direction ordered Viet Minh officers to study it before going into battle. Even the Americans, after their defeat in VN adopted these military precepts when they invaded Irak in 1990 and the book still exists in every military academy in the US. Its imprint and influence were far reaching, and are still used in many sectors, including in business!
Since the VN War and its profound global impact, military thinking has in fact changes enormously. Gone is the standard conventional war based on weapons and materials with battlefield tactics and movements. The latest military conflict still under way- Afghanistan- puts also more emphasis on the psychological warfare aspect, i.e the importance of winning hearts and minds. As in Indochina, it doesn't involve just conventional armies but encompasses all aspects of the conflict and at the heart is gaining the support of the people we are fighting for. Well Giap in 1945 already had that in mind. He's by any standard, the forefather of adapting total warfare tactics to the real conditions of the masses, in another word the concept of people's war.
If the US led war in South VN was a sequel of the First Indochina War led by Giap, the Afghanistan War is the repeat of both, under quite similar conditions. From the military buildup of NATO forces, to the status quo on the ground, the arming and training of the hapless Afghan army, the last ditch manpower surge and finally the Afghanization of the war, we have witnessed the same familiar pattern. After 19 years of mission creep, the longest conflict so far, the US have to come to the conclusion that the war is unwinnable, that the military option was not possible. Even the negotiations resembled the VN conflict, with wranglings about which parties would be at the table. This is a déjà vu scenario that the US should have known better. After the French in Indochina, the disastrous repeat in Saigon and now Afghanistan. We can safely concluded that the lessons of history haven't been absorbed yet.
.Viet Minh top leaders were a bunch of intellects, well read with a propensity for writing. From Ho to Giap, Dong and Truong Chinh, the mysterious theoretician of the Party, they all translated or wrote books to indoctrinate or train their rank and file base to the new methods of revolutionary struggle. Truong Chinh in his detailed book ''the Resistance will Win'' laid out the 3 phases of revolution. He adopted them from Mao's teachings: first the withdrawal phase away from dense urban areas of cities and towns, then the equilibrium phase and finally the general offensive phase. He stressed the importance of timing from one phase to the next, evaluating the strength of the revolutionary forces, the support it gets from the population, the demoralization of the enemy and also the world context, or the support from the US, The Soviet Union and China. In both Indochina wars, the Communists applied exactly to the letter the model to great effect. If modern war strategy was an exact science, Giap would be a reputable scientist.
In 1946-47, Viet Minh forces were still at phase 1 of the struggle but that was about to change. With hard work and ingenuity Giap was building his forces from the bottom up, reinforcing and spreading their areas of control from the northern provinces to the Red Tonkin valley, especially Hanoi province and expanding their influence further South, to the Ha Tinh, Quang Nam zone. While leaving the big cities and towns to French troops, Giap wanted to isolate and harass them by cutting their lines of communication and transport. While colonial forces have the upper hand in number and armament, their movements and mobility were hampered by the bad conditions of roads and the hostility of the terrain, one of Giap definite asset. There`s no better condition than fighting a war while blending your troops into your own landscape.
In a war without fronts against an invisible enemy, hard to distinguish friends from foes, the rebel forces being everywhere and nowhere at the same time, French military superiority was equalized in short order. In a matter of a few years, from 1946-47, we can conclude that phase 2 of the war has come. According to Logevall, in early 1947 Leclerc on an assessment tour in Indochina concluded that in order to turn the tide militarily, France will need to deploy half a million or more of its troops in Indochina. Such a figure seemed ludicrous for the French political leaders at the time. But 20 years later, the US committed that exact number in the South and didn't fare any better.
On the home front, France in 1947 still dazed by the effects of WW2 on its soil, wasn't ready for another defeat in the colonies. It clings to the idea that another humiliation will have to be avoided and that the protectorate system will survive. That explained the political leaders hard line towards relinquishing Indochina and allowing the nations their independence. A lot more had to be done by Ho and Giap to convince French public opinion otherwise. Also the domino effect theory already was emerging to show that France other colonies, in North Africa, Madagascar were watching the events in Indochina and would test the French Metropole in earnest at the first sign of weakness.
The French military leaders were conscious that time was not on their side in Indochina, on the exact opposite of Giap and his forces whose strategy relied on prolonging the fight and testing the limit of their enemy resilience. While the Viet Minh were still at phase 1 of their master plan, Valluy and d'Argenlieu were eager to go for broke, sensing they were possibly at the last phase of their military superiority. Launching operations Lea and Ceinture in Oct 1947 involving large units, Valluy wanted to draw out the Viet Minh and destroy their main units and capture Viet Bac, Viet Minh HQ, and isolate their presence from southern part of China. But Giap already knew and avoided the bait. And he barely escaped being captured on more than one occasion. As usual, the enemy slipped through the lines and when French forces pulled back, then the Viet Minh moved back to the abandoned areas. It was a draw Giap was hoping for.
Valluy failure to destroy the enemy forces and the see saw battles for the next 2 years was the turning point in the Indochina War. With no end in sight, France was switching again to a diplomatic solution with an old card, Bao Dai. The ex emperor becoming advisor to Ho since his abdication in 1945 was in fact absent from his country, neglected and forgotten. He spent his days in the French riviera or in Hong Kong wasting money in casino and night club. His personality and reign in the critical context of Indochina at that time deserve to be a subject of an entire chapter by itself. Vietnam continuing misery and misfortune could be easily traced back to his mediocrity, indecision and utter lack of leadership. Loyal French collaborators coming from the Vietnamese were like those the Americans trusted years later: absent minded and chameleon politicians pretending to do the job but enriching themselves until being replaced.
Mao's new China and Ho's road to victory
China civil war and the Indochina war happened almost at the same time since 1945. Mao's victory over the nationalist forces of Chiang Kai Shek in the fall of 1949 definitely became the watershed event and a game changer for Ho. I am convinced that phase 3 of Ho's strategy started around September 1950 now that the northern base was secured with Mao as a firm ally, the Chinese having officially recognized the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) on January, 18 followed by the Soviets on the 30th. The support and acceptance by both Communist big brothers marked a definitive shift of Ho's foreign alliance push and the hope for the US administration support was officially dead.
Truman also has leaned noticeably over the French camp since his newly appointed Dean Acheson as secretary of State in January 1949. American foreign policy has straightened up, with a staunch anti-communist decision maker at the helm. And Washington was looking the changing conditions in South East Asia with grave concern, now that China became another threat to an already tense situation. With Ho overtly asking the Chinese ally for military and economic help, Truman would have to do the same for its ally the desperately nervous French. But then geography again played a pivotal role in the future outcome of Indochina. While the French remained confident to get American financial and military support in their fight, their commitment would go no further. French hope of direct US involvement on the ground in Indochina, in case of emergency was no more than a fainted illusion. Unfortunately the Americans have their own war to fight in Korea in 1950 with their soldier boots on the ground.
On this fast pursuit for racking up support from allies, Ho personal ties and prestige with the Chinese Communists made the difference. He has taken refuge and living in China for years, speaking their same language and eating the same rice. With his rear base well entrenched in the northern part of VN, next to Chinese border, Ho and Giap could sleep well at night at least knowing they have a well protected shelter in case of hot pursuit by the French. Whatever reservations they had about Chinese intentions, Ho and his colleagues had no choice but to welcome Chinese support. And it was more than substantial in all domains. Historians and experts unanimously confirmed that without the Chinese direct massive aid, Ho and his troops would have little chance of success, both against the French and the Americans.
In May 1949, according to Logevall book, Paris sent Georges Revers (defeat in English), a general with an ominous name to VN to assess the military situation., and make recommendation for the possibility of a Mao tse Tung take over in neighboring China. Revers in his report stressed the necessity for a political solution as the only alternative to the quagmire the French found themselves in and that no military solution was possible. The damning report by an author with a self defeating appellation went on to conclude that a victory by the Chinese communists and their assistance to the Viet Minh will further endanger the French position in Indochina.
In April 1950, Viet Minh government requested military aid in equipment, advisors and training through the CMAG (Chinese Military Advisory Group). Although this military assistance from China was essential, it was in no comparison to the US aid for the French. But the Chinese were very forthcoming to support Ho and the Viet Minh because Mao was predicting that US intentions were less than benevolent. That he will have to face US threat head on, as it will happen in Korea. And helping Ho and his troops would pay dividend in the long run, in a context of people's war of liberation. And more importantly for Ho and Giap was the supply line rear base for Viet Minh troops. In case of French offensive, they could easily withdraw into undetected redoubts, along the VN border, in the Cao Bang, Dong Khe, Dong Dang and Lang Son vicinity.
In people's war, the fish (soldier) strives in the water (people), and the people's army best bet is to be found in impregnable sanctuaries. Giap tactical modus operandi by optimizing the constraints of the terrain was unsurpassed. According to Giap, the people's army must treat the battleground terrain as an ally, not as another adversary. And for the first major offensive against the French, Giap put his finger on Cao Bang, the closest enemy garrison to the Chinese border. and the farthest from any French army command center. Giap's attack in Dong Khe area decimated the French forces that were stationed there during vicious battles extended over many weeks.
In early Sept under pressure from Viet Minh forces, general Carpentier the new Indochina commander took the fateful decision to evacuate the Cao Bang garrison located in the most northern part of VN. Carpentier was a fast rising star of the French military, rising the echelons from major to lieutenant general in 6 years. But his decision for retreating to Dong Khe, a 33 miles stretch was not a simple task. On the 16th, after months of careful preparation, Giap unleashed 5 battalions with artillery and mortar support against Dong Khe, preempting the French draw down from Cao Bang. The outpost was overwhelmed after stiff resistance resulting in the Cao Bang garrison now being cut off. French forces stationed there had no other choice but forcing through enemy lines. The long treacherous march out of Cao Bang was poorly executed. It fell into Viet Minh ambushes that annihilated both the retreating forces as well as the reinforcements coming from That Khe, another outpost in the South of Dong Khe.
In total the French suffered 6000 casualties out of the approximate 10,000 (?) initially on the ground and scores of heavy equipment and weapon were lost. General Carpentier having no experience in Indochina saw his star tumbling as fast as its rise in the battleground of the Far East. The aftershock of Cao Bang rout was felt throughout the Northern province with Lang Son a big town being abandoned. The French fell back practically to the Hanoi vicinity area, withdrawing from all the garrisons from Lao Cai the northern west part to coastal Mong Cai in the east, a perimeter of more than 350 miles wide.
The entire northern part of Tonkin was evacuated and falling into Giap's control. But more important was the realization that Viet Minh forces were equal in heavy armament, logistics with superior manpower and tactical leadership quality. It was the most humiliating defeat ever suffered by France outside of its territory for centuries since the Montcalm battle in Quebec in 1759 according to well known reporter and author Bernard Fall. With the arrival of a new commander in chief, De Lattre de Tassigny, perhaps French honor can be saved and for how long?.
The last lap from a new savior
At the late stage of the game, France resolutely decided to ramp up its conduct of the war against Giap and his troops with a new leader: general de Lattre de Tassigny, a legendary WW2 commander who did more than his share in the fight against Nazi Germany. Above all, de Lattre was an ardent anti-communist. Had France sent him to Indochina earlier, during the fragile debut of the Viet Minh, maybe the situation of Indochina couldn't have been so dim. But at least for once, French decision makers saw the necessity for good leadership in the fight against Communism.
And leadership, de Lattre possessed in excess. From now on, de Lattre would show how to lead his men on the ground and sanctioned those who didn't obey his orders. His belief in the greatness of France was his drive to conduct the fight against the dark forces of totalitarianism and Marxism. His messianic message for the preservation of the glory of France was unshakable. But in his new task of rescuing Indochina, there's a skillful message: the struggle against the Viet Minh must be fought by the Vietnamese first with France support. In an emotional speech on July 11, 1951 in lycee Chasseloup-Laubat the high school (that I attended years later), he challenged the youth of VN not to be 'attentist' or fence-sitters , and to come out and defend their motherland.
As a famous and respected military leader, de Lattre also was an astute student of politics. Although his methods were tough and unyielding on his subordinates, he grasped the necessity that the fighting the VN communists could not be done with France taking the burden alone. The VN people has to choose side, as he told in his famous speech. Either they fight for the Viet Minh, under a bad cause, or join the French in their battle for a democratic VN. But the signs were obvious that the VN people were split and torn and their allegiance was neither with the French nor for the Viet Minh.
They were the innocent victims of a struggle not of their own choosing. How could it be otherwise? The VN middle class and the uneducated peasantry were all longing for a normal and peaceful life. For the intelligentsia, it's rather confusing and complex. The underlying consensus among the VN elite was a rejection of French oppression but the means to attain national independence was in dispute, and in fact the root cause of VN's tragedy.
If I were listening to de Lattre in 1951, how would I have reacted? Beyond the eloquence and reasoned rhetoric, de Lattre wouldn't convince me a bit. To ask an educated VN student to fight for an estranged mère patrie France while his own soil is enslaved and occupied is absurd. In that sense Bao Dai, although a French stooge has the appropriate answer: give us back our independence then we will fight for ourselves. But de Lattre has a different subtle message for the French back home for it's time to let the VN fighting among themselves. With the embryonic Vietnamese National Army (VNA) under the French wing, he accelerated what the French called 'jaunissement' (yellowing) of the war effort, a precursor to Vietnamization, a more dignified labeling under Nixon.
De Lattre already knew that France resources and resoluteness were at the breaking point. And with his son Bernard making the ultimate sacrifice in this ungrateful land, with a tinge of bitterness he thought it's time for a last push to turn the page sooner than later. Although his tour of duty was brief, no more than a year, de Lattre left an unmistakable mark in the battlefield, giving Giap and the Viet Minh all the headache they could handle. Giap sensing that the wind has shifted in his favor decided that the people's war he so carefully planned should enter phase 3 i.e the general offensive.
Giap looked at the forces comparative alignment and thought that he had the capacity for a decisive blow by attacking Vinh Yen, no more than 30 miles northwest of Hanoi. If he succeeded the road to the capital would be open and the victory close at hand. But he totally miscalculated the ground conditions and de Lattre response. The famed general aristocrat unleashed his entire air power into the battle, using recently provided napalm bombs by the US in the heaviest bombing of the war. A ring of fire rained down on the successive waves of enemy assaults and by January 17th, 1951 Viet Minh 312th Division tried a final mass attack on Vinh Yen, again under a curtain of fire from napalm bombs. On that day the French came out victorious under de Lattre personal command and Giap lost 6000 dead and 8000 wounded of his troops, the most serious defeat he encountered so far.
The same scenario and result happened in Mao Khe near Hai Phong and Ninh Binh in the month of May, where Giap lost 9000 troops and 1000 captured according to Logevall. The Viet Minh Central Committee put the blame on Giap cockiness for underestimating the French capability and firepower. Phase 3 general offensive of the Communists started on the wrong foot. Giap under criticism was forced to reverse course and readopted guerrilla tactics for the time being, another 3 years for final victory. If Giap humiliation on the ground was a collective setback for the Viet Minh, de Lattre's son Bernard death near Nam Dinh on the same month of May was a personal tragedy that de Lattre himself would not recover. For de Lattre, the responsability of his son's death rested on his own shoulder for he personally insisted that lieutenant Bernard served on a commando unit fighting a despicable enemy.
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