7. The US and Indochina
After de Lattre return to France and his untimely death in December 1952, the military situation remained deadlocked, a fragile and unsettling status quo. De Lattre aggressive strategy relying on mobile army groups with flexible defensive tactics during his short tenure in Indochina allowed a period of renewed optimism. For the French, the worst seemed to be well behind especially with a firmer commitment from the Americans to increase aid for Indochina. And the late de Lattre de Tassigny, a well respected military hero, played a vital role in reinforcing the US position coupled with a hardening US stand on communism.
Contrary to common knowledge, US military involment in Indochina started well before the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. With the defeat of nationalist China of Chiang Kai Shek to Mao's forces and their daring military attack of Korea in 1951, American policy took a 180 degree turn around. The US suddenly realized that it has to fight the Communist threat both in Europe and in Asia. Truman had more apprehension about Stalin than Roosevelt's right after WW2. If Roosevelt's concern was the rise of nationalism in 1945, Truman's concern was the mounting threat of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. And that will partly explain the US ambivalent stand towards Indochina as it was considered the most difficult subject of international policy the US had ever faced. It became for the next 30 years an albatross hanging over 7 successive US presidents from Roosevelt to Gerald Ford.
US policy in Indochina
Great political leaders have foresight and inevitably knew beforehand world major events that will occur. In that sense, president Roosevelt in my opinion was the first of the political giants. M. Logevall put it nicely in the interview he gave in 2019 about US Vietnam policy, and that argument I fully accept. For Logevall 'Roosevelt saw that the era of imperialism was ending. As the new biggest world power, he wanted the US to be on the right side of history. He blamed European colonialism with its intricate legacy as a factor in both world wars and thought that it could provoke more global conflicts. Had Roosevelt survived into 1946, the end of his 3rd mandate, he might worked to keep France from reclaiming Indochina and might have succeeded...'
America under Roosevelt didn't think much about France and its leaders during the War, namely de Gaulle. He thought that France colonial baggage put her in the wrong side of history and she will eventually have to pay for it. As WW2 came to an end, the thorny question of Indochina stood out and as the leading ally, the US had to come up with the real solution in the midst of world movements for liberation and independence. That put the US administration of Roosevelt on a bind. As we mentioned before, the US was closer to France than to Indochina, in all accounts. Roosevelt then devised a legal instrument while buying for time. He proposed to enact a trusteeship program for Indochina, i.e a gradual implementation of independence, under the supervision of major foreign powers, like Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US. It was a well thought idea, namely to foster a political solution for Indochina and avoid armed conflict. And with hindsight, it might have worked.
This road map for decolonization to put it clearly would be in the interest of France first, ruined and exhausted after a disastrous war on its soil. It also would benefit the people of Indochina, especially the Vietnamese to come up with a peaceful solution among the rival political factions. With a neutral third party presence (with troops), it should have a dampening effect on any of their malevolent excesses, especially from the Communists who seemed to be more aggressive and mistrusted. In another sense it is an informal Geneva Accord 9 years before the actual one. De Gaulle understandably was lukewarm to the idea and he was supported by Churchill. Obviously both countries have colonies they didn't want to lose. Sadly Roosevelt tragic death put an end to that initiative while his successor Truman reviewed its US policy.
The incoming president with his newly chosen team have different perspective on the Far East. While witnessing Soviet aggression in Western Europe, his attitude toward Indochina has changed. On march 12, 1947, he exposed his new foreign policy called the [Truman] doctrine that provided military and financial aid for Greece and Turkey to protect them from Soviet domination. This officially started a new era that we referred to as the Cold War. The US have now a containment policy against Communism all around the globe, and that included Indochina. It increased economic and military aid to Indochina, reaching up to 80% of French expenses later on. Although Truman still had reservations about France colonial design, he practically dropped the idea of trusteeship and supported French effort to win the war in the colony.
France although weakened and tired morally while hanging on to its colonies had skillfully outsmarted the US administration during this period. Sensing the tide turning in their favor, French leaders played the card of an ideological confrontation between the free world and Marxism. And they claimed at the vanguard of that fight for the sake of Indochina but also the US interests. And they needed US full backing. The message was well understood by the Americans who will engage more forcefully now that China becomes the next threat to US interests in Asia.
By a fate of irony, after de Lattre death and the lull in fighting, more French politicians seemed to look for a way out of Indochina. Exactly as Ho and Giap have predicted, the wear and tear of battle would soften French resolve on the home front, being already military check mated on the ground. In 1952, French leaders have sought to enter negotiations with Ho and his government to find a political solution. Meanwhile, Truman and his men were looking for a fight to the finish with the Viet Minh. And they promised to massively increase military assistance to the French except having US ground troops in Indochina.
The US military mission in Vietnam took shape during Truman tenure, with general O'Daniel in Indochina advising general Navarre and sketching a plan to win the war. US politicians also were disembarking in strove for personal assessment on the ground. First John Kennedy then vice president Richard Nixon followed by senator Mansfield. From the statements they made during their visit, it became the most revealing turn of event and explained the underlying reason of later US intervention in VN. As it turns out, what they said then and what they did later was completely opposite. I felt shocked, dismayed and in disbelief.
John Kennedy as a congressman visited Indochina in 1951 in the midst of its turmoil. A Democrat under the new Republican Eisenhower administration, he lambasted the US efforts to assist the French. The US according to Kennedy was having a policy '...In defiance of nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.' And in 1954 he declared ' I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance... can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and nowhere at the same time'. Prescient remarks for a young politician with presidential ambition. And when he became president, he did exactly what he said the US shouldn't do in Vietnam, an amazing flip flop. While in the opposition, he might criticize his Republican president, that's fair game, but there must be a reason for this policy double salto.(?)
What Kennedy did once he became the leader of America will later have disastrous consequences and might already explained the second loss of VN with the death of Diem. The logic behind the US involvement in South VN during his presidency had nothing to do with his grasp of the situation as he perceptively stated in 1951. Understandably Kennedy was afraid of being blamed for the possible loss of VN while he was outsmarted during the Vienna meeting with Khrushev in 1961 and his Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. Facing the Communist threat in VN, he was experimenting the new concept of limited warfare by counterinsurgency methods. And with units like the Green Berets to wage an interdiction war, he was taking the fight to the enemy units in the jungle and to their unrestricted safe bases. The overall result for Kennedy military effort was unclear during his short mandate. But the coup mounted by the VN generals with the murder of Diem and Nhu in 1963 clearly was a disaster. It foretold the beginning of the end for the US presence in VN.
Richard Nixon on visit to Indochina in 1953 as US vice president, bore a different tone. Of course he would not criticize his own administration for the worsening situation, as Kennedy did as a war critic. On the surface Nixon was upbeat and showed optimism that the war still could be won by the French with increasing aid from the US. But deep down, he manifested his doubt, especially for the increasing role the French have given to the NVA (National Vietnam Army), as an effective force against the Viet Minh. The acid test of any army will be on the battlefield. And it's the only way for VN to own its victory by fighting for themselves.
Again the irony of the situation was that 15 years later, the same Nixon as president will push for Vietnamization, the very policy he had reservation then. I could sense a parallel between the 2 resembling situations. On one hand the French were training, equipping and asking the NVA to assume more responsibility in the fighting when the military conditions were worsening. On the other hand Nixon would do the same in 1968, when the South VN situation also was at an impasse. Hanoi leadership could tell the early sign of an American exit and smell that victory was imminent.
Nixon was an innate politician and deviously tried to sabotage the early negotiations between North VN and the US under Lyndon Johnson in 1968 in order to gain votes during the his presidential campaign. By dragging the war for another few years, he could affirm himself as the providential man to bring 'peace with honor' to the most divisive conflict the US ever had. In a sense he did end the US involvement with a peace treaty in 1972 but didn't get any credit because of his impeachment and resignation in 1974. For the record, the US humiliating defeat a year later was his to blame.
Eisenhower position and Dien Bien Phu
In 1953, another change occurred at the highest level of French military leadership in Indochina. General Navarre was replacing general Salan as the new commander in chief. And he was getting a new military adviser from the Americans, general O'Daniel the chief of MAAG (Military Advisor Assistance Group), a new US mission to help channel increased military aid to Indochina and to evaluate French conduct of the war. As usual, the French military brass was aware of the tenuous situation on the ground. And in France, the political situation was also shifting towards a desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. France was exhausted politically with 19 governments in the last 7 years.
Navarre under pressure from the US devised a strategic plan which is a rehashed copy of de Lattre own plan, with elements of the gardes mobiles (mobile units) and the oil spots tactic of occupying population centers and spreading the pacified territory further etc. With O'Daniel backing and to please the Americans for their continuing support, the French intended to wage an agressive campaign, to strike hard and hopefully deal a heavy blow to the Viet Minh forces. Although Navarre was reluctant, he decided on Dien Bien Phu, near the Laos border as the site of the next battle and to lure Giap's forces to a final showdown. The idea was to have a fighting far from densely populated urban areas and avoid heavy civilian casulaties.
The battle plan looked good on paper as Dien Bien Phu could be supplied from close by Laos or by air with new airplanes and bombers provided by the US in great number. Any troop concentration by Giap's divisions would be dealt with by massive bombing. In other words, Dien Bien Phu was designed as a trap to attract Communist forces and to destroy them with the most vicious weapons like napalm canisters, already used to great effect in Vinh Yen, Dong Khe and Na San.
But again the French with the US support completely miscalculated their enemy determination. And this was not the first time. Viet Minh troops were able to carry hundreds of dismounted pieces of heavy artillery up into the mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu thanks to the effort of the coolies carrying these heavy weapons up to the redoubts. Giap had prepared the order of battle in minuted details and completely surprised his adversaries at the critical moments of the battle. In other words, the trappers were being caught by their own bait. The rest was history after May 9, 1954, the day Dien Bien Phu fell.
So how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the Dien Bien Phu event?Some historians blamed him for the loss of Dien Bien Phu and indirectly for the French exit in Indochina. According to their logical explanation, US disregard for France's plight and for her pressing call for US military action in May 1954 was the main reason for France humiliating defeat. And France ended up losing of Indochina. But evidently the real story was much more complex.
In the eyes of Ho Chi Minh and his leadership, the central question was not the French response to their attack on Dien Bien Phu but the American reaction. That's the key for both the Viet Minh and France. In any event, US and French military officials were working closely and watching the situation on the ground with utmost attention. US senior officials gave careful considerations for a possible worsening of the situation. All options were all the table, except sending US ground forces to the battleground.
Eisenhower as an savvy political leader would never casually sending American soldiers to fight for a cause that wasn't well defined, in the eyes of the American public. And as a military leader, with uncontested good judgement and unblemished battlefield experience, he would never have committed ground troops in a far way land, in an unfamiliar terrain and against an unknown enemy. His momentous decision not to intervene and send American troops to fight for France at Dien Bien Phu was a right one. And it was already too late, in January of 1954. The outcome was already decided.
Eisenhower would be in favor of possible air bombings against the enemy if the situation comes to that or at least providing the French with all necessary means to prevail militarily. On March 13, Giap launched an all out offensive on Dien Bien Phu garrison and overwhelmed some strategic dug-outs. The situation becoming critical, Washington had to re-examine the question of air strikes. But there was a caveat: the US would need the consent and participation of British or other allies on military intervention even with air power alone. This would become a joint military operation that would involve the collective burden of the fight and the shared responsibility of decision. In the end, the British paid lip service to its greatest ally and demurred. Winston Churchill even had biting words for Foster Dulles on visit to London asking for British support. 'England didn't have the will to save her own colony (India)' he expounded, 'how could the Americans expect her to shed blood for somebody else colony?'
According to Logevall book, on March 31, Admiral Radford the chairman of JCS convened a meeting of the group to get the view of his military chiefs on the subject of US intervention in Dien Bien Phu. The opinion gathered from his colleagues was sobering and would have resounded as a serious warning years later. General Ridgway, the army chief declared that, the use airpower would not alter the overall military situation in Vietnam and would increase the risk of general war. And US army intelligence was deeply skeptical of the use of airpower in VN, against a determined enemy, as had been demonstrated during WW2 against Germany, Italy and even in Korea. And notwithstanding the formidable antiaircraft capacity of the Viet Minh against the French as the case at Dien Bien Phu whereas airpower was effectively neutralized and the airfield rendered inoperative. With the French garrison encircled and without resupply coming from outside, capitulation was a foregone conclusion.
As an anecdotal story, the French military used female names to earmark their strongholds at Dien Bien Phu: Isabelle, near the southern airstrip, and the main Northern airfield was protected by 8 others, Claudine, Eliane, Dominique, Francoise, Huguette, Beatrice Anne Marie and Gabrielle. They were attractive names no doubt but I didn't see them as relevant and appropriate. On the contrary, I find them to be more enticing for the Viet Minh soldiers to attack and finish them off. It would be more uplifting for French morale to use Napoleon battle victories like Austerlitz, Friedland, Iena etc..., the kind of memories to uphold and defend in Dien Bien Phu.
Contrary to common knowledge, US military involment in Indochina started well before the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. With the defeat of nationalist China of Chiang Kai Shek to Mao's forces and their daring military attack of Korea in 1951, American policy took a 180 degree turn around. The US suddenly realized that it has to fight the Communist threat both in Europe and in Asia. Truman had more apprehension about Stalin than Roosevelt's right after WW2. If Roosevelt's concern was the rise of nationalism in 1945, Truman's concern was the mounting threat of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. And that will partly explain the US ambivalent stand towards Indochina as it was considered the most difficult subject of international policy the US had ever faced. It became for the next 30 years an albatross hanging over 7 successive US presidents from Roosevelt to Gerald Ford.
US policy in Indochina
Great political leaders have foresight and inevitably knew beforehand world major events that will occur. In that sense, president Roosevelt in my opinion was the first of the political giants. M. Logevall put it nicely in the interview he gave in 2019 about US Vietnam policy, and that argument I fully accept. For Logevall 'Roosevelt saw that the era of imperialism was ending. As the new biggest world power, he wanted the US to be on the right side of history. He blamed European colonialism with its intricate legacy as a factor in both world wars and thought that it could provoke more global conflicts. Had Roosevelt survived into 1946, the end of his 3rd mandate, he might worked to keep France from reclaiming Indochina and might have succeeded...'
America under Roosevelt didn't think much about France and its leaders during the War, namely de Gaulle. He thought that France colonial baggage put her in the wrong side of history and she will eventually have to pay for it. As WW2 came to an end, the thorny question of Indochina stood out and as the leading ally, the US had to come up with the real solution in the midst of world movements for liberation and independence. That put the US administration of Roosevelt on a bind. As we mentioned before, the US was closer to France than to Indochina, in all accounts. Roosevelt then devised a legal instrument while buying for time. He proposed to enact a trusteeship program for Indochina, i.e a gradual implementation of independence, under the supervision of major foreign powers, like Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the US. It was a well thought idea, namely to foster a political solution for Indochina and avoid armed conflict. And with hindsight, it might have worked.
This road map for decolonization to put it clearly would be in the interest of France first, ruined and exhausted after a disastrous war on its soil. It also would benefit the people of Indochina, especially the Vietnamese to come up with a peaceful solution among the rival political factions. With a neutral third party presence (with troops), it should have a dampening effect on any of their malevolent excesses, especially from the Communists who seemed to be more aggressive and mistrusted. In another sense it is an informal Geneva Accord 9 years before the actual one. De Gaulle understandably was lukewarm to the idea and he was supported by Churchill. Obviously both countries have colonies they didn't want to lose. Sadly Roosevelt tragic death put an end to that initiative while his successor Truman reviewed its US policy.
The incoming president with his newly chosen team have different perspective on the Far East. While witnessing Soviet aggression in Western Europe, his attitude toward Indochina has changed. On march 12, 1947, he exposed his new foreign policy called the [Truman] doctrine that provided military and financial aid for Greece and Turkey to protect them from Soviet domination. This officially started a new era that we referred to as the Cold War. The US have now a containment policy against Communism all around the globe, and that included Indochina. It increased economic and military aid to Indochina, reaching up to 80% of French expenses later on. Although Truman still had reservations about France colonial design, he practically dropped the idea of trusteeship and supported French effort to win the war in the colony.
France although weakened and tired morally while hanging on to its colonies had skillfully outsmarted the US administration during this period. Sensing the tide turning in their favor, French leaders played the card of an ideological confrontation between the free world and Marxism. And they claimed at the vanguard of that fight for the sake of Indochina but also the US interests. And they needed US full backing. The message was well understood by the Americans who will engage more forcefully now that China becomes the next threat to US interests in Asia.
By a fate of irony, after de Lattre death and the lull in fighting, more French politicians seemed to look for a way out of Indochina. Exactly as Ho and Giap have predicted, the wear and tear of battle would soften French resolve on the home front, being already military check mated on the ground. In 1952, French leaders have sought to enter negotiations with Ho and his government to find a political solution. Meanwhile, Truman and his men were looking for a fight to the finish with the Viet Minh. And they promised to massively increase military assistance to the French except having US ground troops in Indochina.
The US military mission in Vietnam took shape during Truman tenure, with general O'Daniel in Indochina advising general Navarre and sketching a plan to win the war. US politicians also were disembarking in strove for personal assessment on the ground. First John Kennedy then vice president Richard Nixon followed by senator Mansfield. From the statements they made during their visit, it became the most revealing turn of event and explained the underlying reason of later US intervention in VN. As it turns out, what they said then and what they did later was completely opposite. I felt shocked, dismayed and in disbelief.
John Kennedy as a congressman visited Indochina in 1951 in the midst of its turmoil. A Democrat under the new Republican Eisenhower administration, he lambasted the US efforts to assist the French. The US according to Kennedy was having a policy '...In defiance of nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.' And in 1954 he declared ' I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military assistance... can conquer an enemy which is everywhere and nowhere at the same time'. Prescient remarks for a young politician with presidential ambition. And when he became president, he did exactly what he said the US shouldn't do in Vietnam, an amazing flip flop. While in the opposition, he might criticize his Republican president, that's fair game, but there must be a reason for this policy double salto.(?)
What Kennedy did once he became the leader of America will later have disastrous consequences and might already explained the second loss of VN with the death of Diem. The logic behind the US involvement in South VN during his presidency had nothing to do with his grasp of the situation as he perceptively stated in 1951. Understandably Kennedy was afraid of being blamed for the possible loss of VN while he was outsmarted during the Vienna meeting with Khrushev in 1961 and his Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba. Facing the Communist threat in VN, he was experimenting the new concept of limited warfare by counterinsurgency methods. And with units like the Green Berets to wage an interdiction war, he was taking the fight to the enemy units in the jungle and to their unrestricted safe bases. The overall result for Kennedy military effort was unclear during his short mandate. But the coup mounted by the VN generals with the murder of Diem and Nhu in 1963 clearly was a disaster. It foretold the beginning of the end for the US presence in VN.
Richard Nixon on visit to Indochina in 1953 as US vice president, bore a different tone. Of course he would not criticize his own administration for the worsening situation, as Kennedy did as a war critic. On the surface Nixon was upbeat and showed optimism that the war still could be won by the French with increasing aid from the US. But deep down, he manifested his doubt, especially for the increasing role the French have given to the NVA (National Vietnam Army), as an effective force against the Viet Minh. The acid test of any army will be on the battlefield. And it's the only way for VN to own its victory by fighting for themselves.
Again the irony of the situation was that 15 years later, the same Nixon as president will push for Vietnamization, the very policy he had reservation then. I could sense a parallel between the 2 resembling situations. On one hand the French were training, equipping and asking the NVA to assume more responsibility in the fighting when the military conditions were worsening. On the other hand Nixon would do the same in 1968, when the South VN situation also was at an impasse. Hanoi leadership could tell the early sign of an American exit and smell that victory was imminent.
Nixon was an innate politician and deviously tried to sabotage the early negotiations between North VN and the US under Lyndon Johnson in 1968 in order to gain votes during the his presidential campaign. By dragging the war for another few years, he could affirm himself as the providential man to bring 'peace with honor' to the most divisive conflict the US ever had. In a sense he did end the US involvement with a peace treaty in 1972 but didn't get any credit because of his impeachment and resignation in 1974. For the record, the US humiliating defeat a year later was his to blame.
Eisenhower position and Dien Bien Phu
In 1953, another change occurred at the highest level of French military leadership in Indochina. General Navarre was replacing general Salan as the new commander in chief. And he was getting a new military adviser from the Americans, general O'Daniel the chief of MAAG (Military Advisor Assistance Group), a new US mission to help channel increased military aid to Indochina and to evaluate French conduct of the war. As usual, the French military brass was aware of the tenuous situation on the ground. And in France, the political situation was also shifting towards a desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. France was exhausted politically with 19 governments in the last 7 years.
Navarre under pressure from the US devised a strategic plan which is a rehashed copy of de Lattre own plan, with elements of the gardes mobiles (mobile units) and the oil spots tactic of occupying population centers and spreading the pacified territory further etc. With O'Daniel backing and to please the Americans for their continuing support, the French intended to wage an agressive campaign, to strike hard and hopefully deal a heavy blow to the Viet Minh forces. Although Navarre was reluctant, he decided on Dien Bien Phu, near the Laos border as the site of the next battle and to lure Giap's forces to a final showdown. The idea was to have a fighting far from densely populated urban areas and avoid heavy civilian casulaties.
The battle plan looked good on paper as Dien Bien Phu could be supplied from close by Laos or by air with new airplanes and bombers provided by the US in great number. Any troop concentration by Giap's divisions would be dealt with by massive bombing. In other words, Dien Bien Phu was designed as a trap to attract Communist forces and to destroy them with the most vicious weapons like napalm canisters, already used to great effect in Vinh Yen, Dong Khe and Na San.
But again the French with the US support completely miscalculated their enemy determination. And this was not the first time. Viet Minh troops were able to carry hundreds of dismounted pieces of heavy artillery up into the mountains surrounding Dien Bien Phu thanks to the effort of the coolies carrying these heavy weapons up to the redoubts. Giap had prepared the order of battle in minuted details and completely surprised his adversaries at the critical moments of the battle. In other words, the trappers were being caught by their own bait. The rest was history after May 9, 1954, the day Dien Bien Phu fell.
So how the Eisenhower administration reacted to the Dien Bien Phu event?Some historians blamed him for the loss of Dien Bien Phu and indirectly for the French exit in Indochina. According to their logical explanation, US disregard for France's plight and for her pressing call for US military action in May 1954 was the main reason for France humiliating defeat. And France ended up losing of Indochina. But evidently the real story was much more complex.
In the eyes of Ho Chi Minh and his leadership, the central question was not the French response to their attack on Dien Bien Phu but the American reaction. That's the key for both the Viet Minh and France. In any event, US and French military officials were working closely and watching the situation on the ground with utmost attention. US senior officials gave careful considerations for a possible worsening of the situation. All options were all the table, except sending US ground forces to the battleground.
Eisenhower as an savvy political leader would never casually sending American soldiers to fight for a cause that wasn't well defined, in the eyes of the American public. And as a military leader, with uncontested good judgement and unblemished battlefield experience, he would never have committed ground troops in a far way land, in an unfamiliar terrain and against an unknown enemy. His momentous decision not to intervene and send American troops to fight for France at Dien Bien Phu was a right one. And it was already too late, in January of 1954. The outcome was already decided.
Eisenhower would be in favor of possible air bombings against the enemy if the situation comes to that or at least providing the French with all necessary means to prevail militarily. On March 13, Giap launched an all out offensive on Dien Bien Phu garrison and overwhelmed some strategic dug-outs. The situation becoming critical, Washington had to re-examine the question of air strikes. But there was a caveat: the US would need the consent and participation of British or other allies on military intervention even with air power alone. This would become a joint military operation that would involve the collective burden of the fight and the shared responsibility of decision. In the end, the British paid lip service to its greatest ally and demurred. Winston Churchill even had biting words for Foster Dulles on visit to London asking for British support. 'England didn't have the will to save her own colony (India)' he expounded, 'how could the Americans expect her to shed blood for somebody else colony?'
According to Logevall book, on March 31, Admiral Radford the chairman of JCS convened a meeting of the group to get the view of his military chiefs on the subject of US intervention in Dien Bien Phu. The opinion gathered from his colleagues was sobering and would have resounded as a serious warning years later. General Ridgway, the army chief declared that, the use airpower would not alter the overall military situation in Vietnam and would increase the risk of general war. And US army intelligence was deeply skeptical of the use of airpower in VN, against a determined enemy, as had been demonstrated during WW2 against Germany, Italy and even in Korea. And notwithstanding the formidable antiaircraft capacity of the Viet Minh against the French as the case at Dien Bien Phu whereas airpower was effectively neutralized and the airfield rendered inoperative. With the French garrison encircled and without resupply coming from outside, capitulation was a foregone conclusion.
As an anecdotal story, the French military used female names to earmark their strongholds at Dien Bien Phu: Isabelle, near the southern airstrip, and the main Northern airfield was protected by 8 others, Claudine, Eliane, Dominique, Francoise, Huguette, Beatrice Anne Marie and Gabrielle. They were attractive names no doubt but I didn't see them as relevant and appropriate. On the contrary, I find them to be more enticing for the Viet Minh soldiers to attack and finish them off. It would be more uplifting for French morale to use Napoleon battle victories like Austerlitz, Friedland, Iena etc..., the kind of memories to uphold and defend in Dien Bien Phu.
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